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Analysing Productivity Changes Using the Bootstrapped Malmquist 
Approach: The Case of the Iranian banking Industry  
Amir Arjomandi, Abbas Valadkhani, and Charles Harvie 
 
Abstract 
This study employs various bootstrapped Malmquist indices and efficiency scores to investigate 
the effects of government regulation on the performance of the Iranian banking industry over the 
period 2003-2008. An alternative decomposition of the Malmquist index, introduced by Simar 
and Wilson (1998a), is also applied to decompose technical changes further into pure technical 
change and changes in scale efficiency.  A combination of these approaches facilitates a robust 
and comprehensive analysis of Iranian banking industry performance. While this approach is 
more appropriate than the traditional Malmquist approach, for the case of banking efficiency 
studies, it has not previously been conducted for any developing country’s banking system. The 
results obtained show that although, in general, the regulatory changes had different effects on 
individual banks, the efficiency and productivity of the overall industry declined after regulation. 
We also find that productivity had positive growth before regulation mainly due to improvements 
in pure technology, and that government ownership had an adverse impact on the efficiency level 
of state-owned banks. The bootstrap approach demonstrates that the majority of estimates 
obtained in this study are statistically significant. 
 
Keywords: Regulation; Productivity; Banking; Data envelopment analysis; Bootstrap; 
Malmquist indices  
JEL codes: C02, C14, C61; G21 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decade the Iranian banking industry has undergone many substantial changes, such 
as liberalization, government regulation and technological advances, which have resulted in 
extensive restructuring of the industry. These changes in policy have affected both government-
owned banks (including commercial banks and specialized banks) and private banks. The former 
have been the most successful in acquiring market share, and it is mainly due to this reason that 
private banks are much newer than theses banks; they joined to the market after 2001. However, 
it seems that government-owned banks were affected more noticeably after government 
regulation initiatives launched in 2005, which obliged all banks to reduce deposit and loan 
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interest rates considerably. The government also imposed different interest rates and conditions 
on public and private banks, and imposed obligations on government-owned banks to assign 
higher priority in their lending operations to areas such as advanced technology projects, small 
and medium enterprises, and housing projects for low income earners. As a result, the level of 
non-performing loans (NPLs) of government-owned banks increased dramatically after 2006. 
According to the Central Bank of Iran,  CBI, (2006), the annual growth rate of government-
owned banks’ NPLs was less than 30% before 2005, however this figure increased markedly to 
129% in 2006. CBI (2006) also state that the highest share of the NPLs belongs to the 
"manufacturing and mining" (20.1%) and "construction" (19.5%) sectors. For these reasons in 
particular, this study investigates the effect of government policies on the productivity of the 
Iranian banking industry.  
Fethi and Pasiouras (2010), in a comprehensive survey covering 196 studies which had 
applied operational research and artificial intelligence techniques in the assessment of bank 
performance, reveal that almost all studies that obtained estimates of total factor productivity 
growth employed a DEA1-type Malmquist index. This result demonstrates that the Malmquist 
index has widespread use in examining total factor productivity growth. Initially, Caves, 
Christensen and Diewert, (1982) introduced the Malmquist productivity index as a theoretical 
index. Färe et al. (1992) later merged Farrell’s (1957) measurement of efficiency with Caves et 
al.’s (1982) measurement of productivity to develop a new Malmquist index of productivity 
change. Färe et al. (1992) subsequently demonstrate that the resulting total factor productivity 
(TFP) indices could be decomposed into efficiency change and technical change components. 
Färe, Grosskopf, Norris and Zhang (1994b) further decompose the efficiency change into pure 
technical efficiency change and changes in scale efficiency, a development which results in the 
Malmquist index becoming widely popular as an empirical index of productivity change.  
However, Simar and Wilson (1998a) state that the FGNZ model does not provide a useful 
measure of technical change and their empirical results show that all of the mean estimates for 
technical change are insignificant: “many of the inaccuracies in FGNZ … may be attributed to 
their confusion between unknown quantities and estimates of these quantities” (p. 4). Moreover, 
they conclude that “Without a statistical interpretation, it is not meaningful to draw inferences 
from results obtained with these methods as it is otherwise impossible to know whether the 
numbers reflect real economic phenomena or merely sampling variation” (p. 18).  Instead, they 
propose an alternative decomposition of the Malmquist index. They estimate changes in 
                                                           
1
 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is one of the most popular non-parametric approaches in the literature that has 
been used widely in frontier efficiency and productivity methods. 
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technology by changes in the variable returns to scale (VRS) estimate, and further decompose the 
technical changes into pure technical change and changes in the scale of efficiency.  
The DEA approach for estimating distance functions when constructing Malmquist indices is 
problematic. As DEA is a non-parametric approach, it does not allow for random errors and does 
not have any statistical foundation, hence making it inadequate for testing statistical significance 
of the estimated distance functions, or for conducting sensitivity analyses to examine their 
asymptotic properties; see Lovell (2000), Coelli et al. (2005), and Simar and Wilson (1998b, 
1999, 2000). The inherent problem with mainstream DEA analysis is that distances to the frontier 
are underestimated if the most efficient firms within the population are not included in the 
sample. Analysis in this situation leads to biased frontier estimation from the sample and results 
in distances to all other units being measured relative to this biased frontier. Undoubtedly, 
uncertainty is carried through to parameters such as the Malmquist indices of TFP changes which 
are estimated from DEA distance functions. 
To solve this problem, Simar and Wilson (1998b, 2000) define a statistical model, the 
bootstrap simulation method, which makes an allowance for determining the statistical properties 
of the non-parametric estimators in the multi-input and multi-output case, and hence for 
constructing confidence intervals for DEA efficiency scores. In their later study, Simar and 
Wilson (1999) demonstrate that the bootstrap technique can also be employed to estimate 
confidence intervals for Malmquist indices. The most important practical implication of their 
conclusion is that statistical inference becomes possible for Malmquist indices. In this study, we 
employ the Simar and Wilson (1998a) approach to measure the Malmquist index and its 
components - changes in pure technical efficiency, changes in scale efficiency, pure changes in 
technology and changes in scale of technology - to provide a more inclusive and robust analysis 
of productivity and technical change in the banking industry of Iran. For the first time in the 
context of a developing country, we also employ the bootstrap simulation method (Simar & 
Wilson, 1998b; 2000) to determine whether the computed changes in productivity are real or not. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review 
of the bootstrapped Malmquist. Sections 3 and 4 describe the methodology of Malmquist indices 
and the bootstrap technique, respectively. Section 5 explains the data and Section 6 discusses the 
results followed by some concluding remarks. 
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2. Literature Review of Bootstrapped Malmquist Studies 
Despite a large body of literature surrounding the traditional (FGNZ) Malmquist index, there is 
little written about the usage of the bootstrapped Malmquist. Only a small number of studies have 
applied the statistical properties of the Malmquist estimates; see Hoff (2006), Galdeano-Gómez 
(2008), Balcombe et al. (2008), and Latruffe et al. (2008)2. In the case of the Iranian banking 
system, an even more considerable gap exists. The exception is Tortosa-Ausina et al. (2008) who 
use both the FGNZ model and the bootstrap technique to investigate the productivity of the 
Spanish banking system over the post-deregulation period 1992–1998. Their findings show that 
productivity growth occurred, and that this was mainly attributable to an improvement in 
production possibilities (technical changes). Their bootstrap analysis also revealed that 
productivity changes for most of the firms were not statistically significant. 
Our study is, therefore, unique in the sense that the bootstrap technique has not previously 
been applied to the alternative decomposition of Malmquist indices in the evaluation of a 
developing country’s banking system. Wheelock and Wilson (1999) and Gilbert and Wilson 
(1998) analyse the banking systems of developed countries, the US and Korean systems 
respectively. Wheelock and Wilson (1999), using the alternative decomposition of the Malmquist 
productivity index, show that the growing inefficiency of US banks in the period 1984-1993 can 
be largely attributed to the general failure of banks to adopt technological improvements. Gilbert 
and Wilson (1998) study the effect of deregulation on the productivity of Korean banks between 
1980 and 1994. The index of changes in pure technology indicates that after deregulation Korean 
banks altered their mix of inputs and outputs considerably, leading to improvements in 
productivity. The index of change in the scale of technology suggested that the most efficient 
scale size was increasing over time. While it seems that in many empirical applications the 
bootstrap approach is more appropriate than the traditional Malmquist, it has not been widely 
used in other applied studies, presumably due to the lack of user-friendly software. In this study 
we apply the FEAR package in R, which was introduced by Wilson (2006) to estimate technical 
efficiency, the different components of the Malmquist productivity index, and their confidence 
intervals. 
  
  
                                                           
2
 Hoff (2006) applied bootstrapped Malmquist to the fisheries sector for assessing TFP changes for the fleet of 
Danish seiners operating in the North Sea and the Skagerrak. Galdeano-Gómez (2008) applied this technique in the 
field of marketing cooperatives. Balcombe et al. (2008) and Latruffe et al. (2008) estimated bootstrapped Malmquist 
indices for samples of Polish farms. 
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3. Productivity Measurement Using the Malmquist Index 
To measure productivity change between periods 1t  and 2t , consider N firms which produce q 
outputs using p inputs over T-time periods. A generic firm in period 1t  employs input 1t
x to 
produce output
1t
y , whereas in period 2t  quantities are 2t
x and
1t
y , respectively. The production 
possibilities set at time t is: 
 
( ){ }  ,  |        tS x y x can produce y at time t= ,        (1) 
where x is an input vector, nx +∈ , and y is an output vector, my +∈ , at time t. This can be 
described in terms of its sections. For example: 
{ }2 1( ) ( , )mt it ty x y x y S+= ∈ ∈         (2) 
that is its corresponding output feasibility set. Based on Shephard (1970), the output distance 
function for firm i at time 1t  is: 
{ }1 2 11 2  inf 0  / ( )o it t itit tD y y xθ θ≡ > ∈ .        (3) 
The distance function
1 2
o
it tD measures the distance from the i-th firm's position in the input-output 
space at time 1t  to the boundary of the production set at time 2t , where inputs remain constant 
and θ is a scalar equal to the efficiency score. When 1t and 2t are equal, then it will be a measure 
of efficiency relative to technology at the same time, and 1oit tD ≤ . When 1t and 2t are not equal, 
1 2
o
it tD can be <,>, or =1. 
Based on Färe et al. (1992) the Malmquist index between periods 1t and 2t can be defined as: 
1 2 2 2
1 1 2 1
1 2( , )
oc oc
it t it to
i oc oc
it t it t
D D
M t t
D D
   
   =
   
   
        (4)
 
which is a geometric mean of two Malmquist productivity indices for 1t and 2t as defined by 
Caves et al. (1982). If 1M > , then there has been positive total factor productivity change 
between periods 1t and 2t . If 1M < , then there have been negative changes in the total factor 
productivity. 1M =  indicates no change in the productivity. 
 
However, Simar and Wilson (1999) argue that the production possibility set tS
 
is never 
observed and consequently, all distances defined are unobserved. Hence the Malmquist 
productivity index and the distance functions mentioned above must be estimated. This, in 
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sequence, requires estimation of the production set, tS , and the output feasibility set,  ( )y x . 
Burgess and Wilson (1995) describe that the estimated production set can be shown as:  
 { }( , ) ,  ,  1 1,  m n Nt t tS x y y Y x Xγ γ γ γ++ += ∈ ≤ ≥ = ∈ 
      (5) 
Where [ ]1 2, ,...,t t t NtY y y y= and ity denotes ( 1)m× vector of observed outputs, and [ ]1 2, ,...,t t t NtX x x x=
and itx denotes ( 1)n × vector of observed inputs. 1

and γ  are vector of ones and intensity 
variables, respectively. Hence, the corresponding output feasibility sets can be described as: 
 { }( ) ,  ,  c m Nt t ty x y y Y x Xγ γ γ+ += ∈ ≤ ≥ ∈  , and       (6) 
 { }( ) ,  ,  1 1,  v m Nt t ty x y y Y x Xγ γ γ γ+ += ∈ ≤ ≥ = ∈  .      (7) 
Substituting ( )cty x and ( )vty x for ( )ty x in equation (2) lead to estimators of the distance functions 
which can be computed by solving the following linear programs: 
 { }1 2 1 21 2 1( ) max ,  ,  oc Nit t i it t i iit tD y Y x Xλ λ γ γ γ− += ≤ ≥ ∈
     
  (8)
 
 { }1 2 1 21 2 1( ) max ,  ,  1 1,  ov Nit t i it t i iit tD y Y x Xλ λ γ γ γ γ− += ≤ ≥ = ∈ 
      
(9) 
where 
1 2
oc
it tD  features the assumption of constant returns to scale and 

1 2
ov
it tD allows for variable 
returns to scale. Given estimates of the distance functions, estimates of the Malmquist index can 
be constructed by substituting the estimators for the corresponding true distance function values 
in (4): 





1 2 2 2
1 1 2 1
1 2( , )
oc oc
o it t it t
i
oc oc
it t it t
D D
M t t
D D
   
   
=
   
   
         (10)
 
Alternatively, following Färe et al. (1992), this total factor productivity change can be 
decomposed into two components: 








2 2 1 2 1 1
1 1 2 2 2 1
1 2( , )
oc oc oc
it t it t it to
i
oc oc oc
it t it t it t
Eff Tech
D D D
M t t
D D D
   
   
= ×
   
   
 
	
         (11) 
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Where the term outside the square root sign, Eff , is an index of relative technical efficiency 
change, and shows how much closer (or farther away) a firm gets to the best practice frontier. It 
can be >, <, or =1 depending on whether the evaluated firm improves, stagnates, or declines. The 
second component, Tech , is the technical change component which measures how much the 
frontier shifts, and points out whether the best practice firm, relative to which the evaluated firm 
is compared, is improving, stagnating, or deteriorating. It can be >, <, or =1 depending on 
whether the technical change is positive, zero, or negative. 
Färe et al. (1994a) demonstrate that the technical change component can be decomposed 
into two factors: pure technical efficiency change and changes in scale efficiency; 



 
 




2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1
1 2
/
( , )
/
ov oc ov oc oc
it t it t it t it t it to
i
ov oc ov oc oc
it t it t it t it t it t
PureEff Scale Tech
D D D D D
M t t
D D D D D
       
       
= × ×
       
       
  
	 	 	
     (12)
 
where PureEff and Scale are measures of pure efficiency change and change in scale efficiency, 
respectively, and Eff PureEff Scale= ×   . Tech  remains unchanged from (11), and gives a 
measure of change in technology. While Tech signifies that the Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) 
frontier shifts over time, pure efficiency change and scale efficiency change correspond to VRS 
frontiers from two different periods. 
On the other hand, Simar and Wilson (1998a) state that if a generic firm's position in the 
input-output space remains fixed between time 1t  and 2t , and the only change that happens is in 
the VRS estimate of technology (e.g. shift upward), then the Tech presented in (12) would be 
equal to unity, indicating no change in technology. The only way that the Tech in equation (12) 
would show a change in technology is if the CRS estimate of the technology changes. Hence, it is 
concluded by the authors that in such a circumstance, the CRS estimate of the technology is 
statistically inconsistent. Since the VRS estimator is always consistent under the assumptions of 
Kneip et al. (1996), they propose an alternative decomposition of the Malmquist index to estimate 
changes in technology ( Tech ) by changes in the VRS estimate; 
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


 
 




 
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2
2 2 2 1
1 2
/
( , )
/
/
ov oc ov
it t it t it to
i
ov oc ov
it t it t it t
PureEff Scale
ov ov oc ov
it t it t it t it t
ov ov
it t it t i
PureTech
D D D
M t t
D D D
D D D D
D D D
   
   
= × ×
   
   
 
 × ×
 
 
 

	 	
	
 
 
 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1
/
/ /
oc ov
it t it t
oc ov oc ov
t t it t it t it t
ScaleTech
D D
D D D
 
 ×
 
 

	
      (13) 
 
where Tech is further decomposed into pure technical changes, PureTech , and changes in the 
scale of technology, ScaleTech , and     Tech PureTech ScaleTech= ×   . PureTech measures pure 
changes in technology and is the geometric mean of two ratios which measure the shift in the 
VRS frontier estimate relative to the bank's position at time 1t  and 2t . When PureTech is greater 
than unity, it indicates an expansion in pure technology. Specifically, it shows an upward shift of 
the VRS estimate of the technology. ScaleTech provides information regarding the shape of the 
technology by describing the change in returns to scale of the VRS technology estimate at two 
fixed points, which are the firm’s locations at times 1t  and 2t . When ScaleTech  is greater than 
unity, this indicates that the technology is moving farther from constant returns to scale and the 
technology is becoming more and more convex. When this index is less than unity it gives us an 
idea that the technology is moving toward constant returns to scale, and ScaleTech equal to unity 
shows no changes in the shape of the technology. 
A similar decomposition of the Malmquist index is also proposed by Ray and Desli 
(1997). They combine changes in the scale of efficiency and changes in the scale of technology 
into a single term (SCH). However, Simar and Wilson (1999) state that Ray and Desli’s SCH 
confuses changes in the shape of the technology and changes in scale efficiency experienced by 
the production unit. Färe (1997), agrees that Ray and Desli’s alternative decomposition of 
Malmquist incorrectly measures changes in scale efficiency. Other kinds of decompositions and 
components of the Malmquist index are described by Fried et al. (2008), who conclude that the 
choice of appropriate decompositions is dependent on the research question. Accordingly, in this 
study, the comprehensive decomposition of Simar and Wilson (1998a) is employed with the aim 
of providing additional insight into productivity and technical change in the banking industry in 
Iran. 
4. Formulation of the Bootstrap 
Simar (1992) and Simar and Wilson (1998b) are pioneers in using the bootstrap in frontier 
models to obtain non-parametric envelopment estimators. The idea behind bootstrapping is to 
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approximate a true sampling distribution by mimicking the data-generating process. The 
procedure is based on constructing a pseudo sample and re-solving the DEA model for each 
DMU with the new data. Repeating this process many times enables us to build a good 
approximation of the true distribution. Simar and Wilson (1998b) show that the statistically 
consistent estimation of such confidence intervals very much depends on the consistent 
replication of a data-generating process (DGP). In other words, the most important problem of 
bootstrapping in frontier models relates to the consistent mimicking of the DGP.3 They argued 
that this problem refers to the bounded nature of the distance functions. Since the distance 
estimation values are close to unity, re-sampling directly from the set of original data (the so-
called naive bootstrap) to construct pseudo-samples will provide an inconsistent bootstrap 
estimation of the confidence intervals. 
Hence, to overcome this problem, they propose a smoothed bootstrap procedure. They use 
a univariate kernel estimator of density of the original distance function estimates (for efficiency 
scores in that case), and then construct the pseudo data from this estimated density. However, to 
estimate the Malmquist indices, we have panel data instead of a single cross-section of data with 
the possibility of temporal correlation. Thus, Simar and Wilson (1999), in adapting the 
bootstrapping procedure for Malmquist indices, propose a consistent method using a bivariate 
kernel density estimate via the covariance matrix of data from adjacent years. However, the 
estimated distance functions 
1 1it t
D and 
2 2
it t
D  using a kernel estimator are bounded from above unity 
and it is noted by Simar and Wilson (1999) that a bivariate kernel estimator value under this 
condition is biased and asymptotically inconsistent. To account for this issue, Simar and Wilson 
(1998b, 1999) adapt a univariate reflection method proposed by Silverman (1986).4 Therefore, to 
achieve consistent replication of the DGP taking all of these features into account, one must  use 
the smoothed bootstrap.  Repeatedly re-sampling from the Malmquist indices via the smoothed 
bootstrap results in a mimic of the sampling distribution of the original distance functions (a set 
of bootstrap Malmquist indices), from which confidence intervals can be constructed. On the 
whole, this process can be summarized as follows: 
1. Calculation of the Malmquist index 1 2( , )oiM t t for each bank ( 1,..., )i N=  in each time ( 1t
and 2t ) by solving the linear programming models (8) and (9) and their reversals. 
                                                           
3
 See Simar and Wilson (2000) for a thorough analysis based on Monte Carlo evidence. 
4
 This method is founded on the idea of “reflecting” the probability mass lying beyond unity where, in theory, no 
probability mass should exist. 
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2. Construction of the pseudo data set ( ){ }* *, ; 1,..., ; 1,2it itx y i N t= = to create the reference 
bootstrap technology using the bivariate kernel density estimation and adaption of the 
reflection method proposed by Silverman (1986). 
3. Calculation of the bootstrap estimate of the Malmquist index * 1 2( , )oiM t t for each bank
( 1,..., )i N=  by applying the original estimators to the pseudo sample attained in step 2. 
4. Repeating steps 2 to 3 for a large number of B times (in this study B=2000) to facilitate B 
sets of estimates for each firm.  
5. Construct the confidence intervals for the Malmquist indices. 
 
The basic idea designed for construction of the confidence intervals of the Malmquist indices is 
that the distribution of 
1 2 1 2( , ) ( , )o oi iM t t M t t−  is unknown and can be approximated by the distribution 
of * 1 2 1 2( , ) ( , )o oi iM t t M t t− , where 1 2( , )oiM t t is the true unknown index,  1 2( , )oiM t t  is the estimate of the 
Malmquist index, and*
1 2( , )oiM t t is the bootstrap estimate of the index. Hence, aα and bα defining 
the (1 )α−  confidence interval:  

1 2 1 2Pr( ( , ) ( , ) ) 1o oi ib M t t M t t aα α α≤ − ≤ = −
       (14) 
can be approximated by estimating the values *aα and *bα given by: 
 * * *
1 2 1 2Pr( ( , ) ( , ) ) 1o oi ib M t t M t t aα α α≤ − ≤ = −
       (15) 
Thus, an estimated (1 )α− percentage confidence interval for the i-th Malmquist index is given 
by: 
 * *
1 2 1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ) ( , )o o oi i iM t t a M t t M t t bα α+ ≤ ≤ +
       (16) 
A Malmquist index for the i-th firm is said to be significantly different from unity (which would 
indicate no productivity change), at the α % level, if the interval in Eq. (16) does not include 
unity. 
It should be mentioned that using the calculated bootstrap value in step 4, we can also 
correct for any finite-sample bias in the original estimators of the Malmquist indices.  We only 
need to apply a simple procedure outlined by Simar & Wilson (1999) as follows: 
 
The bootstrap bias estimate for the original estimator  1 2( , )oiM t t is: 
   1 *
1 2 1 2 1 2
1
( , ) ( , )( ) ( , )
B
o o o
B i i i
b
bias M t t B M t t b M t t−
=
 
= −   ∑
      (17) 
Thus, a bias-corrected estimate of 1 2( , )oiM t t can be computed as: 
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   
 
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 *
1 2 1 2
1
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
               2 ( , ) ( , )( ).
o o o
Bi i i
B
o o
i i
b
M t t M t t bias M t t
M t t B M t t b−
=
 
= −   
= − ∑
       (18) 
However, as explained by Simar & Wilson (1999), this bias-corrected estimator may have a 
higher mean-square error than the original estimator, and hence it will be less reliable. Overall, 
the bias-corrected estimator should only be considered if the sample variance * 2is  of the bootstrap 
values { }* 1 2
1,...,
( , )( )oi
b B
M t t b
=
is less than a third of the squared bootstrap bias estimate for the original 
estimator, that is; 
 ( )2* 2 1 21 ( , )3 oi B ibias M t ts  <    .         (19) 
This procedure can be achieved using commands malmquist.components and malmquist in the 
FEAR software program. 
The above methodology for Malmquist indices can be easily adapted to the efficiency 
scores. Only the time-dependence structure of the data which is taken into account for the 
Malmquist indices must be changed by replacing 1t and 2t with the period considered. The 
procedure can be done using command boot.sw98 using FEAR. 
 
5. The Data 
To facilitate measurement of efficiency scores and productivity change, we initially had to 
specify sets of inputs and outputs for the banks in our sample. However, there is no consensus as 
to how to specify inputs and outputs. In this study, focusing on bank services, we employ the 
intermediation approach. Under this approach banks are viewed as financial intermediaries with 
outputs measured in dollar amounts, and with labour, capital, and various funding sources as 
inputs. This approach has several variants; asset, value-added and user cost views. Sealy and 
Lindley (1977) focus on the role of banks as financial intermediaries between depositors and final 
users of bank assets, and classify deposits and other liabilities, together with real resources 
(labour and capital), as inputs, and only bank assets such as loans as outputs. Berger, Hanweck 
and Humphrey (1987) classify loans and all types of deposits as "important" outputs since these 
balance sheet categories contribute to bank value added, and labour, capital, and purchased funds 
they classify as inputs. Alternatively, Aly et al. (1990) and Hancock (1991) implement a user-
cost framework to determine whether a financial product is an input or an output owing to its net 
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contribution to bank revenue. Utilising this approach a bank asset can be categorized as an output 
if the financial return on the asset exceeds the opportunity cost of the investment, and a liability 
can be categorized as an output if the financial cost of the liability is less than its opportunity 
cost. 
As our measurement of productivity depends on a mutually exclusive distinction between 
inputs and outputs, following Aly et al. (1990), as well as Wheelock and Wilson (1999) and 
Burgess and Wilson (1995), we classify inputs and outputs on the basis of the user cost approach. 
We include three inputs: labour 1( )x  measured by the number of full-time equivalent employees 
on the payroll at the end of each period, physical capital 2( )x measured by the book value of 
premises and fixed assets, and purchased funds 3( )x  including all time and savings deposits and 
other borrowed funds (not including demand deposits). We include three outputs: total demand 
deposits 1( )y , public sector loans 2( )y including loans for agriculture, manufacturing, mining and 
services, and non-public loans 3( )y . All data were obtained from Iran’s Central Bank archives 
(CBI 2005, and CBI 2008). We consider all banks operating in the Iranian banking industry 
except three banks that are not homogenous in input and output mixes. We have balanced panel 
data for 14 banks and 6 years (2003-2008). 
 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Estimated Output-Oriented Technical Efficiency Scores 
To estimate output-oriented technical efficiency for the banks, the linear programming problems 
in equation (9) must be solved for each bank in each period, and the interpretation is simple. 
When ov
it tD is equal to unity it indicates that the i-th firm lies on the boundary of the production set 
of period t, and accordingly is technically efficient. When ovit tD is below unity it indicates that the 
firm is positioned under the frontier and is technically inefficient. Table 1 summarizes annual 
mean efficiency for the banking industry over the period 2003-2008. Column 2 of Table 1 lists 
the mean efficiency estimates, and columns 3-6 list the bias-corrected estimates, bootstrap bias 
estimates, and the efficiency’s lower and upper bounds for the 95% confidence intervals (annual 
means), respectively, for each year. Table 1 shows that although the industry is inefficient over 
all years, the industry efficiency level improves over the period 2003-2006, and declines 
considerably after 2006. Note that in all cases the mean of estimated efficiency lies to the right of 
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the estimated confidence intervals; this result obviously reflects the theory behind the 
construction of the confidence intervals presented by Simar and Wilson (1998b). 
In addition, the estimates of technical efficiency differ from the bias-corrected estimates. 
In some periods this difference (the bias) is quite small. For instance, the difference was less than 
0.03 between 2004 and 2007, while in 2003 the difference was about 0.07. The means of the 
estimated confidence intervals, which define statistical location of the true efficiency, were pretty 
narrow over 2005, 2006 and 2007. The minor bias of VRS estimates and the relatively smaller 
confidence intervals in these years imply that the results are relatively stable. However, results 
from this Table are very general and do not help us to distinguish between the performance of 
individual banks. Hence, the bootstraps of the efficiency scores for individual banks are displayed 
in three major categories of commercial, specialized and private banks in Tables 2 and 3. For the 
sake of brevity, only the bootstrap of efficiency scores for the years 2003 and 2008 are presented 
in these tables, respectively5.  
[Table 1 about here] 
A comparison of Table 2 and Table 3 shows that the specialized banks are the most 
efficient banks in both years. The results are mixed for commercial and private banks. A number 
of banks show similar efficiencies in both periods, but a few banks show substantial disparities 
over the periods. For instance, among the commercial banks, National Bank and Trade Bank 
were efficient in both periods, whereas Bank Refah, which is quite inefficient in 2003, becomes 
efficient in 2008. On the other hand, the situation of Export Bank becomes worse in 2008, and its 
efficiency deteriorates from 0.95 in 2003 to 0.74 in 2008. Private banks also show similar 
disparities; Parsian Bank and EN Bank appear to be pretty efficient in both periods. Karafarin 
Bank improves its efficiency significantly in 2008 and reaches an efficiency score of 1.0, but 
Saman Bank’s position perform exactly the opposite. 
[Table 2 about here] 
As stated by Simar and Wilson (1998b), relative comparisons of the performance among 
firms based on the estimated efficiency scores should be made with caution. Of special note, 
Housing Bank is efficient in both periods (as its estimated efficiency is 1.000 in both periods), 
and its estimated confidence intervals for 2003 and 2008 overlap. However the estimated lower 
bound in 2008 was much higher than that of 2003, suggesting that its true efficiency may have 
improved in 2008. In this case the bias-corrected efficiency scores can be very helpful in 
                                                           
5
 Results for all years are available from the author upon request. 
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distinguishing between decision units. For instance, the bias-corrected efficiency of Housing 
Bank increases from 0.916 in 2003 to 0.958 in 2008, suggesting that this bank was not equally 
efficient in 2003 and 2008. The bias for some banks is very small; hence, their bias-corrected 
efficiency score is very close to the original estimate (e.g. Saman Bank in 2008), but a few banks 
show large differences (e.g. Bank Mellat in 2003). The bias estimates, in general, are higher for 
the most efficient banks (with the estimated efficiency of 1.000) in both years. There are also 
substantial dissimilarities between banks’ confidence intervals; both Tables 2 and 3 show that a 
number of estimated confidence intervals are quite wide (e.g. Housing Bank and EN Bank in 
Table 2 and BIM and Parsian in Table 3), while others are rather narrow (e.g. Bank Refah and 
Karafarin Bank in Table 2 and Bank Refah and Saman Bank in Table 3). In general, the widths of 
confidence intervals appear to be narrower and the bias-corrected efficiencies tend to reach 
higher values in 2008.  
[Table 3 about here] 
6.2 The Decomposition of the Malmquist Index  
Concentrating only on efficiency estimates can provide an incomplete view of the performance of 
banks over time. It is for this reason that changes in distance function values over time could be 
caused by either 1) movement of banks within the input-output space (efficiency changes), or 2) 
progress/regress of the boundary of the production set over time (technological changes). The 
decomposition of the Malmquist index, as explained in section 2, makes it possible to distinguish 
changes in productivity, efficiency and technological change. 
Table 4 reports various estimates of productivity changes for banks in the three categories 
over five pairs of years between 2003 and 2008. Almost all of the estimates are significantly 
different from unity at the 90% or 95% level of significance. Only BIM is insignificantly 
different from unity for one pair of years (2007/2008). Over 2003-2004 - the period after the 
private banks came into existence – of all 14 estimates of productivity changes only 5 banks show 
productivity gains. In this period, two of the specialized banks, Agricultural Bank and Housing 
Bank, had the highest levels of productivity losses. On average, the industry showed an 11% 
productivity loss (i.e. 0.98 productivity changes). The results for the three pairs of years, 
however, were quite the opposite. 
During the period 2004-2005 all of the banks (with two exceptions) show moderate gains 
and all specialized banks show productivity expansions. In the period 2005-2006 the results 
indicate significant gains for ten banks, and significant decreases in productivity for four banks 
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(two specialized banks and two private banks). All commercial banks show rather large 
productivity gains over this period. During the period 2006-2007 the industry showed a 
significant increase in productivity; about 28% on average. All banks but one showed 
productivity gains, and among these banks two of the specialized banks (i.e. ED Bank and BIM), 
demonstrated massive productivity advances of 2.29 and 2.67, respectively. The results for 2007-
2008, however, were largely different. Most of the banks experienced large productivity losses 
and none of the commercial banks were productive. BIM, which showed the highest level of 
productivity gain in 2006-2007, exhibited a 33% productivity loss in 2007-2008. This pattern was 
also true for some of the commercial and private banks (Export Bank, Trade Bank, Bank Mellat 
and EN Bank). Using the four components explained in section 2, we can now trace the main 
causes of the productivity changes over the sample period. Tables 5-6 present estimates of the 
changes in pure efficiency, scale efficiency, pure technology and scale of technology, 
respectively.  
[Tables 4, 5 and 6 about here] 
Estimated changes in pure efficiency have been reported in Table 5. In sum, for 
consecutive years, out of the 70 estimates of changes in pure efficiency, only 24 estimates were 
different from unity while all of them were statistically significant. A number of banks showed no 
changes in pure efficiency for all reported years (e.g. National Bank, Bank Mellat, Agricultural 
Bank, ED Bank, BIM, and Parsian Bank). During 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 (i.e in the post 
regulation era) when interest rates and the allocation of direct lending facilities were regulated, 
the number of banks with losses in pure efficiency increased to four and five banks, respectively. 
Hence, the industry, on average, showed negative changes in technical efficiency as a result of 
inappropriate policies. 
Table 6 reveals the estimated changes in scale efficiency where all changes from unity are 
statistically significant. Results for BIM are not significant in any of the reported periods. The 
results for 2003-2004, 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 are mixed. Over these three periods most of the 
banks experienced negative changes in scale efficiency (i.e. the estimates are less than unity) or 
very low levels of positive changes. Over the period 2006-2007, the results deteriorated and only 
two banks show some improvements in scale efficiency (i.e. ED Bank and EN Bank). Other 
banks either experienced negative changes or their scale efficiency remains more or less 
unchanged (e.g. Bank Refah, BIM and Parsian Bank). Hence, these results, in conjunction with 
those for changes in pure efficiency, indicate that the considerable changes in bank productivity 
for 2006-2007 cannot be attributable to efficiency change components (pure efficiency change or 
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scale efficiency change); they can be explained only by technological changes. The results for 
2007-2008 were enhanced as nearly all of the government-owned banks showed considerable 
positive changes in scale efficiency. However, the situation for private banks deteriorated as 
demonstrated by larger declines. As can be seen by the last row of Table 6, the final period shows 
positive changes in scale efficiency, suggesting that scale inefficiency was a major source of 
inefficiency among the Iranian banks.  
Tables 7 and 8 show the estimated changes in pure technology in production possibilities 
and scale of technology, respectively. The estimated changes are significantly different from 
unity in all cases at different significance levels. In a number of cases these changes for 
specialized banks and private banks could not be computed due to the constraints imposed in the 
linear programming to estimate cross-period distance functions. We have indicated these cases by 
INF in Tables 7 and 8, indicating that they were infeasible to compute. 6 The results from Table 7 
reveal that in 2003-2004 technology among the government-owned banks shifted inwards for all 
but Export Bank. However, in 2004-2005, 2005-2006, and 2006-2007, the estimated changes in 
pure technical were greater than unity for nearly all firms with the only exception being Export 
Bank in 2004-2005, suggesting an overall technological progress in the industry. This is most 
probably due to the technological advances in the banking industry which commenced in 2004 
such as increased numbers of automated teller machines (ATM), credit cards, debit cards and 
online-branches. Almost all banks also showed large decreases in technology for the period 2007-
2008. For the private banks all these changes, except for EN Bank in the last period, were 
significantly greater than unity in the sample period.  
[Tables 7 and 8 about here] 
Finally, as to the shape of technology, the estimated changes in the scale of technology 
are presented in Table 8. The estimated changes in the private banks are significantly less than 
unity in almost every case, indicating that the technological region of these banks in the input-
output space was moving toward constant returns to scale between 2004 and 2008. Among the 
government-owned banks the results are the opposite in three periods; 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 
and 2006-2007, meaning that returns to scale of technology were becoming increasingly convex 
and more variable. Given that the private banks are much smaller than the government-owned 
banks, these results seem to imply that the most efficient scale size is falling over these periods. 
However, the technology faced by government-owned banks in the last period moved toward 
constant returns to scale; since the estimated changes showed values less than unity for most of 
                                                           
6
 This difficulty is also experienced by Gilbert and Wilson (1998). 
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them. In brief, the results in Tables 6 and 8 emphasize that the portion of the technology 
confronting government-owned banks seems to have moved substantially further from constant 
returns to scale, and the banks have performed under decreasing returns to scale for a long period.  
In general, the results in Tables 4 to 8 indicate that while government ownership resulted in 
large advances in the technology of commercial and specialized banks over time, it also caused 
scale inefficiencies and kept the most efficient scale size smaller than it otherwise would have 
prevailed. Government-owned banks show no positive changes in pure technical efficiency 
during the sample period. Also, after the regulation, three of the largest commercial banks have 
become considerably inefficient. This may be attributed to the significant growth of NPLs since 
2006. However, the technology advances of government-owned banks offset the increase in scale 
and pure technical inefficiencies over 2004-2005, 2005-2006, and 2006-2007, and hence, 
productivity increases in almost all government-owned banks. But, over the period 2007-2008 
large increases in the scale efficiency of these banks do not offset the rise in pure technical 
inefficiency and the reduction in pure technology (in production possibilities). Hence, on average, 
their productivity deteriorates considerably through time.  
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has employed bootstrapped Malmquist indices and efficiency scores developed by 
Simar and Wilson (1998b, 1999) to investigate the effects of Iranian government regulation 
launched in 2005 on the technical efficiency and productivity changes of the banking industry 
over the period 2003-2008. We also applied an alternative decomposition of the Malmquist 
index, introduced by Simar and Wilson (1998a), to provide a more comprehensive analysis of 
productivity and technical changes in the banking industry. Hence, four different components of 
productivity changes were estimated; i.e. changes in pure technical efficiency, changes in scale 
efficiency, pure changes in technology and changes in scale of technology. The bootstrap 
approach emphasises that the majority of our estimates are statistically significant. 
Based on our results, it appears that the industry efficiency level (output-oriented 
technical efficiency) has improved over the period 2003-2006, and deteriorated considerably soon 
after the regulatory changes were introduced. Also, our findings show that the highly efficient 
banks are among either private or government-owned banks but not the specialised banks. 
Productivity changes show the same fluctuations as technical efficiency and the extent of 
productivity changes declines significantly after 2006. In general, it can be concluded that 
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although the regulatory changes had different effects on different banks, the efficiency and 
productivity of the industry has declined after introducing the regulation. There is a significant 
room for improvement in government-owned banks in terms of technical and scale efficiency.  It 
seems that government control of these banks tends to limit incentives and the ability of 
managers to operate efficiently. As a result, government-owned banks move farther from constant 
returns to scale, and the banks perform under decreasing returns to scale for a long period.  
It can therefore be suggested that the privatization of banking industry should be 
expedited and the government should reduce its political interference to boost the efficiency and 
productivity of banks in Iran. We found that the productivity of private banks has fallen 
considerably after regulations have been imposed since 2005-2006. One may argue that the 
lacklustre performance of banks was mainly due to a considerable rise in deposits and scale 
inefficiency attributable to the lack of institutional growth. 
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Table 1, Bootstrap estimates (Annual average) 
Year Estimated Eff Bias-Corrected Bias Lower Bound Upper Bound
2003 0.8940 0.8258 0.0681 0.4890 0.8908
2004 0.9542 0.9284 0.0258 0.8305 0.9542
2005 0.9793 0.9685 0.0107 0.9309 0.9793
2006 0.9911 0.9877 0.0033 0.9777 0.9911
2007 0.8928 0.8826 0.0103 0.8623 0.8926
2008 0.9382 0.9028 0.0354 0.6285 0.9378
Mean 0.9416 0.9160 0.0256 0.7865 0.9409
Source: Author’s calculations.  
Table 2
Bootstrap of efficiency scores, 2003
Bank Estimated Eff Bias-Corrected Bias Lower Bound Upper Bound
 - Government-owned Banks:
          Commercial Banks:
National Bank 1.0000 0.9155 0.0845 0.5082 0.9962
Bank Sepah 0.8995 0.8440 0.0555 0.7062 0.8965
Export Bank 0.9538 0.8972 0.0566 0.7382 0.9506
Trade Bank 0.8188 0.7727 0.0461 0.6212 0.8160
Bank Mellat 1.0000 0.9087 0.0913 0.5457 0.9954
Bank Refah 0.6665 0.6266 0.0399 0.5084 0.6639
         Specialized Banks:
Agricultural Bank 1.0000 0.9181 0.0819 0.5197 0.9962
Housing Bank 1.0000 0.9164 0.0836 0.0013 0.9971
Export development Bank (ED Bank) 1.0000 0.9102 0.0898 0.5745 0.9954
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM) 1.0000 0.9221 0.0779 0.4090 0.9970
 - Private Banks:
Karafarin Bank 0.5122 0.4816 0.0307 0.3996 0.5108
Saman Bank 0.6651 0.6234 0.0417 0.4967 0.6629
Parsian Bank 1.0000 0.9116 0.0884 0.4200 0.9962
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank) 1.0000 0.9139 0.0861 0.3983 0.9970
Mean 0.8940 0.8258 0.0681 0.4891 0.8908
Source: Author’s calculations.  
Table 3
Bootstrap of efficiency scores, 2008
Bank Estimated Eff Bias-Corrected Bias Lower Bound Upper Bound
 - Government-owned Banks:
          Commercial Banks:
National Bank 1.0000 0.9603 0.0397 0.5574 0.9997
Bank Sepah 0.9097 0.8796 0.0301 0.7794 0.9093
Export Bank 0.7382 0.7153 0.0229 0.6177 0.7380
Trade Bank 0.9617 0.9341 0.0275 0.8150 0.9613
Bank Mellat 1.0000 0.9583 0.0418 0.6862 0.9995
Bank Refah 1.0000 0.9589 0.0411 0.5616 0.9995
         Specialized Banks:
Agricultural Bank 1.0000 0.9574 0.0426 0.8045 0.9994
Housing Bank 1.0000 0.9584 0.0416 0.7654 0.9994
Export development Bank (ED Bank) 1.0000 0.9794 0.0206 0.5642 0.9991
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM) 1.0000 0.9592 0.0408 0.4282 0.9996
 - Private Banks:
Karafarin Bank 1.0000 0.9571 0.0429 0.5071 0.9910
Saman Bank 0.5252 0.5085 0.0167 0.4349 0.5250
Parsian Bank 1.0000 0.9554 0.0446 0.4749 0.9993
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank) 1.0000 0.9576 0.0424 0.8026 0.9990
Mean 0.9382 0.9028 0.0354 0.6285 0.9371
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table 4
Estimates of Malmquist indexes (changes in productivity)
Bank 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008
 - Government-owned Banks:
          Commercial Banks:
National Bank 0.8208* 1.0740* 1.1795* 1.1426* 0.9083*
Bank Sepah 0.6920** 1.0804* 1.3003* 1.0548* 0.7610*
Export Bank 1.1310* 0.7633* 1.0915* 1.2199* 0.7202*
Trade Bank 0.8487* 1.0972* 1.0695* 1.2057* 0.8988*
Bank Mellat 0.6510* 1.1616* 1.2716* 1.2565* 0.9020*
Bank Refah 1.0179* 1.0818* 1.2881* 1.0993* 0.7688*
         Specialized Banks:
Agricultural Bank 0.5847* 1.1201* 1.1231* 1.0357* 0.9371*
Housing Bank 0.4532* 1.2940* 1.3102* 1.1968* 1.1560*
Export development Bank (ED Bank) 0.8865* 1.0110* 0.6927* 2.2992* 1.2269*
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM) 1.3221* 1.0966* 0.8645* 2.6721* 0.6755
 - Private Banks:
Karafarin Bank 1.2538* 1.0707* 1.1854* 1.0004* 0.8405**
Saman Bank 1.1387* 1.1847* 1.4870* 0.5171* 0.8969*
Parsian Bank 0.8804* 0.9007* 0.9943* 1.0232* 1.0139*
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank) 0.8332* 1.1086* 0.8291* 1.2109* 0.9565*
Mean 0.8939 1.0746 1.1067 1.2810 0.9045
Note: Numbers greater than unity indicate improvements and less than unity indicates declines.
Single asterisk (*) denote significant differences from unity at 90%; double asterisk (**) denote significant 
differences from unity at 95%.
Source: Author’s calculations.
 
 
Table 5
Estimates of change in pure efficiency
Bank 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008
 - Government-owned Banks:
          Commercial Banks:
National Bank 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00*
Bank Sepah 0.9910* 0.9994* 1.0000 1.00* 0.9046*
Export Bank 1.0477* 1.00* 0.9568* 1.0140* 0.7610*
Trade Bank 1.2196* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 0.9615*
Bank Mellat 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00*
Bank Refah 1.4970* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00*
         Specialized Banks:
Agricultural Bank 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 0.9883* 1.0118*
Housing Bank 0.7051* 1.1618* 1.1770* 0.9850* 1.0528*
Export development Bank (ED Bank) 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00*
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM) 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00*
 - Private Banks:
Karafarin Bank 1.5435* 1.3415* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00**
Saman Bank 1.4351* 1.00* 1.00* 0.5883* 0.8879*
Parsian Bank 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00*
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank) 1.00* 1.00* 0.9588* 1.0429* 1.00*
Mean 1.1028 1.0359 1.0066 0.9728 0.9677
Note: Numbers greater than unity indicate improvements and less than unity indicates declines.
Single asterisk (*) denote significant differences from unity at 90%; double asterisk (**) denote significant 
differences from unity at 95%. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
 
23 
 
Table 6
Estimates of change in scale efficiency
Bank 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008
 - Government-owned Banks:
          Commercial Banks:
National Bank 1.0940* 1.00* 0.9916* 0.5217* 1.7376*
Bank Sepah 0.9437* 0.9856* 0.9111* 0.7321* 1.0454*
Export Bank 1.2852* 0.9868* 0.8594* 0.4986* 1.8684*
Trade Bank 0.9586* 1.0120* 0.9962* 0.6048* 1.6495*
Bank Mellat 0.9552* 1.0401* 1.0065* 0.6837* 1.4624*
Bank Refah 1.0029* 1.00** 1.0000 1.00*** 1.00***
         Specialized Banks:
Agricultural Bank 0.8808* 0.9940* 1.0521* 0.5659* 1.2925*
Housing Bank 0.7966* 0.9547* 0.9785* 0.9392* 0.9916*
Export development Bank (ED Bank) 1.00* 0.9041* 0.7461* 1.1078* 1.3207*
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
 - Private Banks:
Karafarin Bank 0.9078* 0.8151* 1.1262* 0.9555* 0.8010*
Saman Bank 0.8895* 1.1712* 1.00* 0.9458* 0.9559*
Parsian Bank 1.00*** 1.0000 1.0000 1.00* 1.00*
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank) 1.00* 1.00* 0.9849* 1.0152* 0.9373*
Mean 0.9796 0.9903 0.9752 0.8265 1.2187
Note: Numbers greater than unity indicate improvements and less than unity indicates declines.
Single asterisk (*) denote significant differences from unity at 90%; triple asterisk (***) denote significant  
differences from unity at 99%. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
 
Table 7
Estimates of change in pure technology
Bank 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008
 - Government-owned Banks:
          Commercial Banks:
National Bank 0.9636* 1.1555* 1.1698* 1.1883* 0.9340*
Bank Sepah 0.8489* 1.0850* 1.1528* 1.1672** 0.9145*
Export Bank 1.0988* 0.7439* 1.2648* 1.2298*** 0.9431*
Trade Bank 0.8309* 1.1080* 1.0750* 1.0640* 0.8204*
Bank Mellat 0.9138* 1.0802* 1.1977* 1.1675* 0.9043*
Bank Refah 0.6698* 1.0794* 1.2865* 1.1072*** 0.7392*
         Specialized Banks:
Agricultural Bank 0.7891* 1.0766* 1.0232* 1.0932** 0.9049*
Housing Bank 0.9454* 1.2338* 1.1366* 1.2158** 1.1001*
Export development Bank (ED Bank) INF INF INF 1.3235*** INF
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM) INF INF INF INF INF
 - Private Banks:
Karafarin Bank INF INF INF INF INF
Saman Bank INF 1.1151*** 1.6001*** INF 1.0815*
Parsian Bank INF 1.1631* 1.0889* 1.1016* 1.0615*
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank) INF INF INF 1.1260** 0.9374*
Mean 0.8825 1.0841 1.1996 1.1622 0.9401
Note: Estimates greater than unity indicate an increase in pure technology and 
estimates less than unity indicates a decrease in pure technology. INF=Infeasible to compute. 
Single asterisk (*) denote significant differences from unity at 90%; double asterisk (**) denote significant 
differences from unity at 95%; triple asterisk (***) denote significant differences from unity at 99%. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
 
24 
 
Table 8
Estimates of change in scale of technology
Bank 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008
 - Government-owned Banks:
          Commercial Banks:
National Bank 0.7785* 0.9294* 1.0168* 1.8428* 0.5596*
Bank Sepah 0.8715* 1.0108* 1.1041* 1.2343* 0.8799*
Export Bank 0.7642* 1.0396* 1.0493* 1.9619* 0.5370*
Trade Bank 0.8736* 0.9784* 0.9985* 1.8736* 0.6908*
Bank Mellat 0.7458* 1.0338* 1.0548* 1.5739* 0.6820*
Bank Refah 1.0121* 1.0022* 1.0012* 0.9928* 1.0400*
         Specialized Banks:
Agricultural Bank 0.8412* 1.0466* 1.0432* 1.6936* 0.7918*
Housing Bank 0.8534* 0.9454* 1.0008* 1.0640* 1.0064*
Export development Bank (ED Bank) INF      INF      INF      1.5681* INF      
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM) INF      INF      INF      INF      INF      
 - Private Banks:
Karafarin Bank INF      INF      INF      INF      INF      
Saman Bank INF      INF      0.9070* 0.9288* 0.9769*
Parsian Bank INF      0.7744* 0.9130* 0.9288* 0.9551*
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank) INF      INF      INF      INF      1.0885*
Mean 0.8425 0.9668 1.0111 1.4734 0.8371
Note: Estimates greater than unity show that the technology is moving farther from constant return to scale,
and estimates less than unity indicate that the technology is moving toward constant returns to scale.  
INF=Infeasible to compute.
Single asterisk (*) denote significant differences from unity at 90%. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
 
